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Abstract 
 
Opposition unity is often described as prerequisite of successful regime transitions.  
Particularly in presidential systems with plurality elections, the degree of opposition unity 
or fragmentation seems to go a long way to explain the success or failure of opposition 
parties.  But when do opposition actors unite against the President and his ruling party? 
When are they able to surmount their internal tensions and coalesce in their 
democratizing battle against authoritarian rule?  When does the anti-regime cleavage 
cancel out personal, ideological, and other differences?  Or defining the puzzle the other 
way round: what explains the eventual failure of strategic coordination? Electoral rules 
(Cox), authoritarian divide et impera strategies, societal cleavages (class, ethnic, regional, 
ideological), or personal rivalries?  And indeed, can such variables explain outcomes, or 
should opposition unity be viewed as endogenous, in which the likelihood of successful 
democratization helps to unite a fragmentary opposition.  The paper investigates these 
issues with reference to Sub Saharan African case materials.  
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1. Introduction 
Opposition cohesion is often described as a pre-requisite for successful regime 
transitions.  As long as the incumbent strong man is able to keep the opposition divided, 
it is argued, his1 hold on power is safe.  A relatively unpopular ruler can use incumbency 
advantages to maintain the upper hand, notably through state patronage and intimidation.  
In such cases, even relatively free and fair elections need not represent a threat to the 
incumbent since he can usually manufacture a victory with a plurality of the vote, as the 
opposition divides its support across numerous candidates. 
 
Meanwhile, divided oppositions expend energy and political capital in internal 
squabbles.  They criticize each other as much as the incumbent and the ruling party and 
inevitably lose some legitimacy in the process.  In regime transition narratives, the 
unification of the opposition under a single banner invariably is presented as a watershed 
in the ousting of the incumbent, just as divisions within the opposition are invariably 
mentioned to explain the ability of the President to retain power.  Thus, in descriptions of 
the democracy movement in Zambia in the early 1990s, the making of a grand opposition 
coalition uniting business and labor under the MMD banner has been described in nearly 
heroic terms (Rakner, 2004; Svasand and Rakner, 2003;  Burnell, 2001).  On the other 
hand, the survival of the Moi regime in Kenya through out the 1990s was widely blamed 
on the inability of the opposition to unite.  This dynamic was particularly evident in the 
1992 Kenya elections (Throup and Hornsby, 1998), when President Kenneth Moi was 
able to retain the presidency despite being able to garner only 36% of the vote, despite 
intimidation during the campaign and some fraud on election day.  On the other side, 
three different candidates each managed at least 17 percent of the vote.  Clearly, the 
Kenya story goes, had the opposition overcome its disunity, it might have booted Moi out 
of power.  Opposition politicians were widely blamed in these latter cases for putting 
their personal interests above the cause of democracy.  
 
 These two narratives are paradigmatic: key political alliances are almost 
invariably part of the story in any electoral victory. The ability of incumbents to keep key 
supporters in the presidential fold helps to determine whether they retain power, while 
defections to the opposition often presage electoral defeat.  There have not been many 
cases of opposition victories over incumbents in Sub Saharan Africa since 1990: by my 
count (see Table 1), out of the 92 presidential elections that took place between 1990 and 
2004, electoral turnovers occurred 13 times.  In addition, there are 5 cases of an electoral 
victory by an opposition candidate, in which no incumbent was defeated.  The best 
example of the latter is perhaps the case of Kenya, once again: in the 2002 elections, the 
opposition, now united around Mwai Kibaki, defeated Moi’s handpicked successor, 
Uhuru Kenyatta (Anderson, 2003).  Moi chose to respect the constitution and not run for 
another term.   
 
 Thus, there appears to be a clear correlation between cohesion and electoral 
victory.  But the issue of causation is far less clear.  Do broad opposition coalitions bring 
about victory?  Or do opposition candidates gain supporters as the prospects of victory 
                                                 
1 The overwhelming majority of incumbent presidents in these illiberal electoral systems are men, so I will 
use the male pronoun throughout.   
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approach?  Unfortunately, the information necessary to disentangle these two alternatives 
is not easily available in systematic form.  Nonetheless, this paper will investigate the 
circumstances which influence the degree of opposition cohesion in electoral autocracies, 
and its relationship to electoral outcomes.  
 
 I start by defining the universe of states this essay focuses on, electoral 
autocracies or hybrid regimes (Diamond, 2002).  Arguably, for reasons that will become 
clear, opposition cohesion is even more important to transitions in such regimes, defined 
as regimes that combine relatively competitive multi-party elections with low levels of 
executive accountability and various political practices associated with authoritarian rule.  
As has been acknowledged by a number of scholars (e.g., Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 
2001, 2002), these are inherently ambiguous regimes, in which incumbents derive key 
advantages in the political game by resorting to a “menu of manipulation”, but 
oppositions nonetheless have a chance to advance to power through the ballot box.  It is 
important to problematize the degree of democracy in the political system, in order to 
show that opposition cohesion is more likely to occur the more democratic the political 
system.  I then examine transitions as a “tipping game”, in which opposition cohesion is 
not a cause of transition but rather a consequence of a growing probability of transition 
due to a number of interrelated factors that are hard to distinguish.  I argue that the 
particular dynamics of political transitions can be understood to result from strategic 
behavior on the part of key political actors playing out a tipping game, in which, ceteris 
paribus, they wish to be on the winning side.  Finally, in the second half of the paper, I 
examine the different factors that will condition the likelihood of opposition cohesion.  I 
examine in turn, the constitutional correlates of cohesion, the international dimension and 
the socio-cultural factors.   The discussion is largely based on a data set of 92 presidential 
elections in Sub Saharan Africa, but the implications are generalizable beyond that 
region. 
 
2. How Electoral, How Authoritarian? 
The discussion has so far assumed that multi-party elections are the defining 
events of the political transitions.  But this is not always the case.  On the one hand, in a 
number of cases, regime transitions are precipitated by military intervention or some 
form of extra-electoral action.  Thus, in Mali, a pro-democracy military coup spelled the 
end of the Traore regime.  It might have survived the street protests and diplomatic 
pressures, much like Robert Mugabe has in Zimbabwe (Compagnon, 2000), or Lansana 
Conte has in Guinea, if relatively junior officers had not conspired so effectively against 
it (Camara, 2000).  In Congo (Quantin, 1997) and Benin (Decalo, 1998; Heilbrunn, 1993; 
Banegas, 1997), a national conference pushed the president out of office in favor of an 
interim government and elections, in what local observers labeled a “civilian coup”.   In 
these cases, the founding election followed an inter regnum, and came well after the old 
regime had fallen.  A temporary government organized the elections, and the different 
candidates and parties competing for seats rarely enjoyed the advantages of a typical 
incumbent, even if the interim government may have played favorites 
 
Before the regime fell, either elections were so unfair as to preclude an opposition 
victory, or they were non-existent.  In fact, in many cases, it was precisely the fact the 
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elections were unwinnable that led to the opposition to favor extra-legal means to gain 
power.  In these cases, it is possible to argue that the key factors were the numerous 
defections suffered by the president in the preceding weeks that tipped the balance 
towards the opposition.  In Benin, President Kerekou’s regime progressively lost 
domestic support through out 1989-1991 because of simply disastrous economic 
performance and the explicit refusal of the major donors -- including France – to support 
the regime without changes.  The National Conference was the final event, but the fall of 
the government seemed inevitable long before it fell.  In Mali, economic collapse in the 
early 1990s led to prolonged student and civil service protests again the regime.  The 
regime’s legitimacy having collapsed, top senior officers in the army did not rise to 
President Traore’s defense when junior officers seized the presidential palace, and his 
two-decade-old regime was removed without virtually anyone willing to stand up for it 
(Vengroff, 1993;  Thiriot, 1999).  But clearly, the decisiveness of the military action that 
removed the Traore regime was not predicated on the breadth of support for it.  The 
Malian army turned out to have democratic proclivities and organized elections, which 
introduced the current multi-party democratic regime.  There are just as many instances 
in which the military intervened successfully in an antidemocratic manner, despite little 
popular support and no obvious political alliance behind it.  The military coup in Algeria 
that prevented the victory of the Islamist FIS party at the polls in December 1991 is an 
example, as is the December 1999 coup in Cote d’Ivoire by General Robert Guei.  The 
latter attempted to legitimize his rule with suspect elections a year later, but the absence 
of domestic support, plus intense international pressure eventually forced him to 
acknowledge the electoral victory of Laurent Gbagbo, himself an ethnic entrepreneur 
with little respect for democratic norms (Contamin and Losch 2000). 
 
This essay is nonetheless primarily interested in countries in which the opposition 
political actors compete in elections that they generally consider imperfect, but winnable.  
In turn, this leads me to hypothesize that the level of democracy that exists in the system 
conditions the ability of the opposition to coalesce.  Zimbabwe in the last decade offers 
an example of opposition cohesion existing despite very high levels of repression.  But 
Zimbabwe stands out as a relative exception, and it seems intuitively clear that the ability 
of the opposition to coalesce and eventually win an election is in large part a function of 
the degree of democracy that exists within the system.  This is not easy to test 
quantitatively without knowing much more about the dynamics within the opposition.  
Nonetheless, a crude test is possible:  in a data set of 92 direct presidential elections in 
Africa between 1990 and 2004, I collected data on the share of the vote received by the 
leading opposition candidate, since the higher this score, the more likely the opposition is 
united.  In fact, this number is significantly correlated (p=.-44.5) with the Freedom House 
scores of political rights and civil liberties.2  Since some authoritarian leaders tolerate 
reasonably high scores by the leading opposition candidate in elections which they have 
no intention to lose, this is a remarkably high correlation.  Clearly, the more democratic 
the country, the higher the share of the vote going to the opposition’s top candidate.   
 
                                                 
2  In two round voting systems, only the second round was used; the two freedom house scores were added, 
so the range of possible scores went from 2 (most democratic) to 14 (least democratic).  This progression 
explains the sign on the correlation coefficient. 
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In some countries, no matter how popular the opposition is, it will not win an 
election because fraud, intimidation and gerrymandering (for parliamentary regimes) will 
rob it of the victory.  In Chad, for instance, the Deby regime has countenanced regular 
elections since the early 1990s in order to assuage donor demands for governance 
improvements.  Deby has even allowed the opposition to force him into a runoff (in 
1996).  But  the regime has used a combination of electoral manipulation, intimidation 
and violence -- political assassinations have been common -- as well as cooptation of key 
elements of the opposition to dominate the political game (Buijtenhuijs, 1998).  Various 
structural factors militate against opposition cohesion:  Chad is a huge and under-
populated country, with very low levels of literacy and poor communications systems.   
There is little experience of legislative politics and the party system is volatile and little 
institutionalized.  Religious, regional and ethnic differences divide politicians and their 
parties.  But Deby has masterfully used carrot and stick to worsen the effects of these 
structural dynamics. 
 
Schedler (2002) may well be correct in his assessment that in all electoral 
autocracies, each election that is conducted provides a medium to long-term boost to the 
opposition and delegitimizes autocratic rule, but nonetheless a clear distinction exists 
between “grey regimes” and pure electoral autocracies such as Chad or Togo under 
Eyadema, where an opposition victory is simply inconceivable.  In the “grey regimes”, on 
the other hand, the presumption exists that the opposition could possibly win despite 
incumbency advantages; in other words, it may secure such a decisive majority that 
incumbents cannot secure an official victory despite using various shenanigans.  In such 
states constitutional legitimacy has some significant weight, and so governments cannot 
steal elections too blatantly.  Thus, President Babangida’s best efforts were not enough to 
prevent the electoral victory of Abiola in the 1993 elections in Nigeria, for instance.   In 
Madagascar’s December 2001 elections, similarly, incumbent President Ratsiraka 
appears to have tried various forms of fraud to deny a simple majority electoral victory to 
his rival, Marc Ravalomanana, in order to force a second round, which he hoped to win in 
some manner.  The fact that distinguishing between these regimes is not easy does not 
mean that the distinction is not meaningful.  
 
Thus, opposition cohesion and the possibility of an electoral victory over an 
incumbent is a function of the level of democracy in countries, which convenes multi-
party elections.  At the risk of stating the obvious, electoral fraud almost invariably 
benefits incumbents; thus the greater the amount of electoral fraud, the less likely a 
transition, even if oppositions are united.  The perfect illustration of this is Zimbabwe, in 
which a relatively united opposition is not currently able to remove President Mugabe 
from power, because his core coalition remains intact, most notably the support of the 
military and internal security apparatus (Compagnon, 2000; Rotberg, 2004).  
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Table 1:  Opposition Victories, Sub Saharan Africa, 1990-2004 
 
#  Country Year Winner 
Winner’s 
share
Share of 
second 
candidate 
 Freedom 
House 
Score
1 Benin 1991Nicephore Soglo 36.2 27.2 5
1 Benin 1991Nicephore Soglo 67.5 32.5 5
2 Benin 1996Nicephore Soglo 35.7 33.9 4
2 Benin 1996Mathieu Kerekou 52.5 47.5 4
3 Burundi 1993Melchior Ndadaye 65.7 32.9 14
4 Cape Verde 1991Antonio Mascarenhas 73.4 26.6 5
5 Cape Verde 2001Pedro Verona Pires 46.5 45.8 3
5 Cape Verde 2001Pedro Verona Pires 49.43 49.42 3
6 CAR 1993Ange-Felix Patasse 37.3 21.7 7
7 Congo-B 1992Pascal Lissouba 35.9 20.3 6
7 Congo-B 1992Pascal Lissouba 61.3 38.7 6
8 Ghana 2000John Kufuor 48.4 44.8 5
8 Ghana 2000John Kufuor 57.4 42.6 5
9 Guinea B. 1999Kumba Yala 38.8 23.4 8
9 Guinea B. 2000Kumba Yala 72 28 8
10 Kenya 2002Mwai Kibaki 62.2 31.3 6
11 Madagascar 1992Albert Zafy 45.9 28.6 8
11 Madagascar 1992Albert Zafy 66.7 33.3 8
12 Madagascar 1996Didier Ratsiraka 36.6 23.4 6
12 Madagascar 1996Didier Ratsiraka 50.7 49.3 6
13 Madagascar 2001Marc Ravalomanana 51.5 35.9 6
14 Mali 1992Alpha Konare 45                5 
14 Mali 1992Alpha Konare 69 31                5 
15 Malawi 1994Bakili Muluzi 47.2 33.5 5
16 Niger 1993Tandja Mamadou 34.3 26.6 8
16 Niger 1993Tandja Mamadou 54.4 45.6 8
17 Senegal 2000Abdou Diouf 41.3 30.1 7
17 Senegal 2000Abdoulaye Wade 58.5 41.5 7
18 Zambia 1991Frederick Chiluba 75.8 24.2 5
 
 
Notes:  Data taken from author’s data base.  See text for definitions. 
 
The link between the level of democracy and the prospects for the opposition are 
well captured in table 1, which provides information on the 18 cases in which the 
opposition managed to win a presidential election.  The Freedom House Scores show that 
all of these elections have taken place in states that are “partly free” or “free”, with the 
exception of the victory of Ndadaye in Burundi, a tragically pyrrhic victory since he was 
assassinated in a military coup less than a year later.   
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In addition, the table shows that 11 of the 17 cases were decided in two round 
majority voting systems, which suggests that this electoral system facilitates opposition 
cohesion, a theme we return to below.  
 
 
3. Transitions as a Tipping Game 
Regime transitions and the ouster of an incumbent ruler in an electoral autocracy 
are often over-determined processes.  After they have happened, several factors appear to 
each have played a central role.  This is indeed one reason that scholarly debates continue 
in the “transitology” field about the relative explanatory power to attribute to different 
factors, from international pressures, to economic pressures, external shocks, elite 
fragmentation and opposition cohesion.  Usually, a compelling case can be made for each 
factor. 
 
Some of these explanatory factors are clearly exogenous.  For instance, leaders’ 
actions cannot influence weather patterns or the international price of raw commodities, 
yet prolonged drought, or a worsening in the international terms of trade can negatively 
impact the domestic economy, with consequences for the popularity and stability of the 
regime in place.  Similarly, positive shocks can benefit governments.  Analysts typically 
emphasize negative shocks, but recent history provides plenty of examples of windfall 
revenue increases coming to governments because of a sudden jump in oil or coffee 
prices.    
 
Of course, the actions of government also affect the economy.  Thus, unpopular 
governments may be tempted to engage in excessive borrowing or unsustainable 
monetary policies to buy support with public expenditures in the short term, though this 
will eventually undermine macro-stability.  Indeed, politicians have notoriously short 
time horizons and they may be tempted to pursue unsustainable policies in order to buy 
time in reaction to exogenous factors.  Thus, the quality of Nigerian economic policy-
making declined sharply subsequent to the oil price declines in the 1990s.  A number of 
governments all over the world have reacted to economic shocks with unsustainable 
international borrowing, sometimes causing considerable damage to economic long-term 
prospects. 
 
But many of the factors shaping the dynamics of a regime transition are not so 
clearly exogenous.  To be sure, the behavior of political actors, both within the governing 
majority and within the opposition, can be explained in part with reference to such factors 
as ideological or ethnic factors that do not change quickly.  In Cameroon, as well as in 
many other countries, for instance, the army has been ethnically shaped over many years 
by the regime; since his arrival to power, Paul Biya has made sure the officer corps is 
predominantly Beti and southern.  The loyalty of top officers to the regime is 
strengthened by various links of kith and kin, as well as their rational calculation that 
Biya’s fall would result in the probable loss of a number of advantages from which they 
benefit today.  In the early 1990s, democratization in Burundi was brutally ended by the 
Tutsi officer corps, which simply could not countenance the loss of power and privileges 
that elections and the emergence of a Hutu-dominated government implied.  Dan Posner 
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(2004) and others may be right to say that ethnic identity and conflict are constructed but 
once they are constructed, their logic pervades economic and political institutions and can 
be considered as fixed in the short and medium term.  
 
At the same time, the behavior of political actors is often highly contingent: self-
interested and rational actors respond to events in a context of substantial information 
asymmetries and uncertainty.  Even in ethnically or ideologically polarized political 
situations, institutional actors are likely to support a stable regime, but less likely to back 
one which is tottering or obviously unstable.  Political actors want to be on the right side 
of history.  Their support for a regime is in part self-serving, and they are more likely to 
withdraw the support if the regime’s survival seems in doubt.  Their main difficulty is 
gauging correctly the regime’s chances of survival, which is typically difficult in a 
political environment without an effective press, poorly institutionalized parties and in 
general little transparency.   
 
Defecting from the regime is risky, moreover, for if the incumbent manages to 
stay in power then defectors will pay a substantial penalty.  In some cases, if the defector 
is correct in his assessment that the regime is doomed but defects too early, the penalty 
will be exacted before the incumbent actually falls.  This is why highly unpopular and 
bankrupt regimes take so long to fall.  To the bitter end, the regime manages to retain 
some support from would be defectors that do not want to defect too soon.  Once it is 
clear that the incumbent’s fate is sealed, however, things can move very quickly as 
numerous actors defect as quickly as they can to derive the benefits of defection. 
 
Political transitions thus constitute highly contingent politics, in which actors act 
strategically in a context of information asymmetries.  Opposition dynamics and the 
degree to which opposition groups coalesce successfully can be viewed as a “tipping” 
game.  Political transitions can be understood as the rapid movement from one power 
equilibrium to another, in the course of which a majority of political forces moves from 
one coalition to another.  The incumbent had a winning majority, but loses it, thanks to 
defections of key elements to the opposition.    
 
I would like to argue that tipping, or “cascades” (Laitin, 1998) represent a useful 
heuristic to understand these dynamics in electoral autocracies.  First, in mature 
democracies, the contingent politics of politicians is considerably less autonomous of 
voters and their preferences.  It would be inconceivable for the socialist and communist-
dominated trade unions in a country like France to switch their support to a right wing 
party, and even if they did, their members would be unlikely to follow suit.  Ideological 
divisions and long-standing cleavages shape the actions of politicians, who seek the 
support of voters within a fairly narrow and well-established political space, in which 
economic and social policies dominate.  On the other hand, in most multi-party systems 
that have emerged out of the Third Wave of democratization, political cleavages are not 
well-set and identity politics typically trump ideology.  Voting is often closely tied to 
region, ethnicity, language and or religion.  As a result, political alliances are more fluid 
and changing, and individual politicians have greater degree of autonomy in the deals and 
alliances they make to gain political power.  I recognize that the previous statement is not 
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equally true in all countries and may change over time, and below I examine the impact 
of variance on this issue for the likelihood of opposition coalescence.  But as a general 
statement comparing the modal electoral autocracy with the modal mature democracy, 
the statement can be viewed as relatively unproblematic.  Tipping dynamics are 
essentially elite processes that seem more likely to take place in political system in which 
party platforms do not sharply polarize the party system and, as a result, the relationships 
across politicians and parties is more fluid.   
 
Secondly, elections are not the entire show in the electoral autocracies with which 
we are concerned.  Because elections are highly imperfect with fraud before and during 
election day, and because the incumbent uses various underhanded tactics to try to win 
the election, elite deal-making is an important dimension of politics.  The decisions of 
key politicians weigh heavily on electoral outcomes and their legitimacy. 
 
How do these tipping dynamics take place?  In some circumstances, a single actor 
can tip the balance away from the incumbent regime.  The defection of an important 
ethnic leader, who in effect represents a sizeable segment of the national electorate, may 
be the signal that the incumbent’s fate is sealed and encourage a cascade of other 
defections.  In Benin, for instance, the victory of Soglo in 1992 hinged on his ability to 
convince other opposition candidates, whom he had defeated in the first round, to support 
him.  One key ally proved to be Adrien Houngbedji, who would be rewarded with the 
position of Speaker of the Parliament.  Yet, four years later, it was the latter’s open 
support for  Kerekou, once again following the first round (in which he had come in third 
with 19.7 % of the votes) that would ensure the defeat of President Soglo.  Kerekou 
would name Houngbedji his first Prime Minister.  
 
  More typically, no single actor can claim this leverage, or it is impossible to 
know in advance which actor will tip the balance in this manner.  Then, the key 
dimension of a tipping game is a problem of coordination.  Thus, the survival of the 
regime is conditional on the support of actors A, B, C, and D.  It is probably the case that 
the regime only needs the support of two of these to survive.  Thus, any of the four need 
to be sure that at least two of the others are defecting before it will choose to defect.  A 
will defect from the regime, if A believes that at least two of the other actors are also 
defecting.  The probability of defection is a closely guarded secret, since it will be 
severely punished by the regime if it manages to survive, or does not fall immediately, so 
it is very hard for A to know the intentions of the other key actors, and similarly, it is in 
A’s interest to conceal his preferences.  True, there may be a special reward to those 
actors who defect first and early, since they may be rewarded with a prominent position 
in the successor regime, but early defection is particularly risky.   
 
Much the same dynamic takes place within the declared opposition.  There also, 
problems of coordination are paramount.  As long as the incumbent appears unassailable, 
opposition cohesion is less likely.  Individual opposition leaders gain an advantage from 
maintaining their own autonomy, deriving notoriety and perhaps material advantage as 
leaders of a specific region, ethnic group or social class.  As such leaders, they can 
negotiate with the incumbent ruler, who will have more of an incentive to deal with them 
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than if they were secondary leaders in a larger opposition alliance.  Perhaps each would 
like to lead the opposition alliance, even if its defeat was assured, but deciding who that 
will be poses classic prisoners’ dilemma situations, as each prefers the secondary gains of 
being a minor opposition leader to the larger but far more uncertain gain associated with 
being the leader of the opposition.  
 
These calculations and collective action dilemmas change somewhat as the ruler 
becomes less popular and the regime begins to totter.  On the one hand, the bickering 
over who gets to lead the transition becomes more acerbic as the fruits of victory become 
more tangible.  But on the other hand, the incentive to strike a side deal with the regime 
go down as its future appears less assured, and the gains from becoming even a lieutenant 
in the next regime more certain.  Overall, opposition cohesion appears more likely when 
an opposition victory appears more likely.  Of course, this cohesion may not last long. 
The “united front” that wrested power from the autocratic incumbent may fall apart after 
the election, when a new executive emerges and bickering over how to share power 
becomes inevitable.  But in the run up to victory, it is not unusual to see a cohesive 
opposition. 
 
We often see the phenomenon of regional or ethnic leaders sitting on the fence, 
not entirely of the regime, yet not of the opposition either, and willing to join the 
governing coalition, albeit temporarily, in exchange for various material and other 
benefits.  Again, the tipping dynamic is characteristic:  the movement of one actor away 
from the regime, or from the fence to the opposition, may be decisive in shifting 
perceptions about the viability of the regime.  
 
It is indeed striking how often the new leadership following a transition is made 
up of politicians who were neither radically opposed to the old order, nor prominent in it.  
Far more typical is the emergence of political actors during the transition who may have 
played secondary roles within the regime before defecting, or who moved back and forth 
between regime and opposition through out their careers.  Thus, in Senegal, Abdoulaye 
Wade and some of his closest lieutenants in the PDS had served in governments under 
Abdou Diouf at different points in the 1980s and 1990s, while Wade’s victory in 2000 
was in part due to key defections from the Diouf regime.  In Eastern Europe in the 1990s, 
a surprising large proportion of the politicians that emerged from elections to participate 
or lead governing cabinets could not be described as hard-core opponents of communist 
rule, but typically had not been dissidents either.  Instead, they were men and women 
who had “gotten along to get along” with the region’s communist order.    
 
If I have discussed opposition cohesion and regime defections together, it is 
because they are usually part of the same general dynamic.  Thus, in Zambia, most of the 
components of the united opposition were elements of the UNIP regime until the end of 
the 1980s (Ihonvebere, 1998).  In sum, the key dynamic of the Zambia transition was not 
the unity of the opposition, but rather the inability of Kenneth Kaunda to maintain the 
integrity of his ruling coalition.  The defection of the labor movement from the 
presidential majority was as important to the victory of the MMD, as the fact that the 
union movement then became part of a bigger alliance.  Opposition cohesion and 
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incumbent fragmentation are often mirror images of each other, and cannot be understood 
separately.  Opposition cohesion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a regime 
transition.  It is only when defections in the regime swell the opposition, and it manages 
to unite that the conditions for a transition are clearly met.  
 
 Clearly, it is important to distinguish the unity of the opposition from its 
breadth. The opposition can be reasonably united, but not nearly substantial enough to 
challenge incumbents.  In the Cote d’Ivoire throughout much of the 1990s, Laurent 
Gbagbo was the undisputed leader of a united, albeit relatively inconsequential 
opposition, challenging the still united regime of Houphouet-Boigny and his PDCI, but 
unable to threaten it. 
 
Nonetheless, there are few such cases, because it is difficult for the opposition to 
maintain its unity in the face of such pressures.  In stable electoral autocracies like Togo, 
Tanzania, or in Uganda,  the ruling party has weathered the political liberalization of the 
last decade without a significant enough threat to its hegemony for opposition cohesion to 
much matter (On Uganda, see Furley,  2000).  In these cases, the government invariably 
combines “carrot and stick” to undermine opposition resolve.  Using state resources, 
incumbents can encourage defections from the main opposition coalition and promote its 
fissiparous tendencies.  State funding for political parties can constitute one particularly 
insidious form of bribery in an economic setting in which the financing of political 
activities is problematic.  The promise of an important office for politicians who join the 
presidential majority is another.  On the stick side, various forms of intimidation, from 
temporary arrests to murder, all feature on the “menu of manipulation”.   
 
The opposition may remain cohesive, even as it is reduced to a core of politicians 
whose political identities are so marked in opposition to the regime, that they are less 
easily able to rejoin the presidential majority.  Thus, in Cameroon, Paul Biya managed to 
reestablish his hold on power in the 1990s, following a period in which it appeared 
extremely shaky.  The opposition has been led through out by John Fru Ndi and his party, 
the SDF.  Though at one point a relatively broad multi-ethnic alliance, the SDF has 
slowly but surely been reduced to a core of support in Douala and western parts of the 
country.  Many SDF supporters and fellow travelers have rejoined the presidential 
majority, and Fru Ndi is now perhaps the only major politician left in the SDF opposition 
(Ebeko, 1999; Takougang, 2003).  Much the same could be said of Gabon or Togo.  
 
In sum, this first part of the paper has advanced two propositions about opposition 
cohesion.  First, I have argued that transition episodes are characterized by tipping 
dynamics, which help to explain their pace and rhythm.  The likelihood of opposition 
cohesion is largely determined by perceptions regarding the prospects for opposition 
victory.  Second, such tipping dynamics are more likely to characterize electoral 
autocracies, in which elections are rigged enough to favor incumbents, but not so 
thoroughly that they will always necessarily win. 
 
The remaining sections of this paper briefly investigate the factors which can 
affect these tipping dynamics. 
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Institutional Factors 
 What institutional factors affect the ability of the opposition to coalesce?  This is a 
huge topic, but it is possible to make several points.  
 
 First, some electoral systems privilege coalition building more than others.   For 
example, as suggested by the data presented above, two round majority voting systems 
clearly facilitate opposition unity.  Parties can forge reciprocal agreements that each will 
support the candidates of their political partner whenever they emerge on top following 
the first round.  These work well both in presidential and parliamentary elections.  Thus, 
in Senegal, in the 2000 elections, Wade emerged from the first round in second place 
with 31 percent of the vote, behind the incumbent President Abdou Diouf who garnered 
41.3 percent of the vote.  In a first past the post system, this would have meant the victory 
of the incumbent.  In Senegal, despite bitterly disputed first round in which different 
opposition candidates competed against each other, nonetheless, they forged an 
agreement to prepare for the run off second round.  Moustapha Niasse, the long time 
Diouf associate who had recently left the PS to form his own party and had received 16.8 
percent of the vote.  Sensing the likelihood of an opposition victory, Niasse forged a deal 
with Wade, and publicly backed him.  Wade won the run off with 58 percent of the vote 
and would name him Prime Minister in his first government.  One might mention that a 
fourth candidate Djibo Ka, another mainstay of PS governments in the 1980s and early 
1990s, chose to endorse Diouf for the second round, mistakenly believing the Socialist 
president would survive.   
 
 I have already alluded to a remarkably similar story of inter-round negotiation 
taking place in Benin.  There as well, the incumbent won the first round before losing in 
the majoritarian run-off (See Table 1). The point is that the two round majority system is 
ideal for this wheeling and dealing.  Candidates can use the first round to gauge their 
level of support, often determined by ethno-regional factors, and then bargain for a good 
deal for themselves with the candidate they calculate will win in the second round.  
 
 The two round majority system is thus relatively favorable to challengers.  
Nonetheless, manipulation of the process by incumbents can often trump this pro-
challenger dimension.  In Gabon through out the 1990s, for instance, President Bongo 
made sure to win a majority in the first round and thus avoid the dangers of a second 
round.   Much of Francophone Africa has used some version of the two round system 
since independence, a clear case of the historical influence of France, the colonial power, 
since this has been the system in France’s Fifth republic.  For his part, however, Paul 
Biya in Cameroon changed the constitution away from the French model before allowing 
the country to return to multi-party rule in the 1990s; he preferred a one round plurality 
system, which is much more favorable to the incumbent.  It allowed him to sneak through 
the highly fraudulent 1992 elections with an official score of 39.9% of the vote. 
 
 Second, we can ask: is opposition coalition more likely in presidential or 
parliamentary regimes?  This is difficult to answer because outside of the old established 
democracies, there appears to be a negative correlation between the power of the 
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president and the degree of democracy in the system.  Typically, electoral autocracies 
concentrate power in the hands of a president, while parliamentary regimes are more 
democratic than fully presidential ones.3  So, in practice, it is hard to tell whether it is the 
presidential form that undermines opposition cohesion or the fact that the regime is not 
democratic.  
 
 In the universe of African cases, the most democratic countries tend to be the few 
parliamentary countries:  Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa stand out in this respect.  
Interestingly, only Mauritius has a history of coalition building and electoral turnover; 
both Botswana and post-apartheid South Africa have been dominant party regimes in 
which oppositions have never won an election.   
 
 Having said that, the characteristics of presidentialism does affect the likelihood 
of cohesion.  On the one hand, as is well established, presidentialism results in weaker 
political parties and less institutionalized party systems (Maiwaring and Scully, 1995; 
Carey, 2002; van de Walle, 2003).  It is possible to hypothesize that party discipline and 
party system stability facilitates the kind of deal making that is central to coalition 
building, so one would think presidential systems would be less conducive to opposition 
cohesion.  On the other hand, as suggested by the Senegalese case described above, it is 
easier to make deals around a presidential election, which need not involve many 
individual parliamentary constituencies, but can be forged by a couple men based in the 
capital.  
 
 
Historical/Cultural Factors 
Again, room constraints prevent a complete discussion, but two specific points 
can be made.  First, a history of past experiences with democratic forms of government, 
and in particular, with elections, favors the opposition in electoral autocracies.  If the 
country has gone through past democratic episodes, the opposition can rely on past 
experiences with political parties.  This is perhaps why political parties appear 
considerably stronger, and party systems more institutionalized in Latin America 
(Mainwaring and Scully, 1995) or Eastern Europe, for instance, than in Africa (van de 
Walle, 2003). In the former, the opposition is likely to be stronger and more skillful, 
thanks to the experiences gained in previous episodes.   
 
 Second, in earlier research (Bienen and van de Walle, 1991), I showed that there 
were systematic regional differences in the length of tenure of world leaders.4  Only 5 
percent of Latin American leaders remained in power after 8 full years in office, while in 
Africa and the Middle East 30 percent of leaders remained in power.  Thus, leaders in 
Latin America tend to stay in power less time.  There are strikingly few leaders in Latin 
American history that stay in power for a decade or more.  Only 18 of the more than 
thousand Latin American leader in office over the last two hundred years have been in 
                                                 
3  Steven Fish, in this volume, makes a similar argument vis a vis the regimes in East Europe and the ex-
Soviet states.   
4 The study was based on 2,256 leaders from over a hundred independent countries since the beginning of 
the 19th century.  
  13
power as long as 14 years.  On, the other hand, in Africa, even thoroughly mediocre 
leaders with a weak grasp of power, like Samuel Doe in Liberia, routinely stay in power a 
decade.  These differences are not easily explained, and are not explained by the level of 
democracy, the likelihood of military intervention or whether or not the system is 
presidential or parliamentary.  Instead, they appear related in complex ways to a region’s 
political culture. 
 
 In many cases, tenures are set by institutional mechanisms such as term limits, 
which exist in many Latin American countries, even non-democratic ones.  But such 
institutional mechanisms are clearly endogenous and are responses to culturally mediated 
demands for mechanisms to shorten leaders’ tenure.  If so, it makes sense to think that 
similar dynamics may exist to assist opposition cohesion in order to limit presidential 
tenures.  This is clearly hypothetical, but if there is the perception that a president’s time 
in power is limited and likely to end soon, opposition leaders are more likely to unite to 
force the issue.  If on the other hand, the president’s tenure seems legitimate and 
unquestioned, then the tipping mechanisms described above are more likely to militate 
against successful opposition cohesion.   
 
 Certainly, there are striking differences across regions in the turnover rates in 
recent converts to multi-party politics.  The low rates of turnover in Africa’s newly 
democratic systems contrast with the higher rates in other regions.  Some of these 
differences may be related to institutional factors, and perhaps African incumbents 
benefit in part from more advantages than in other regions, but it can also be 
hypothesized that national political culture is more tolerant of long incumbency.  
Certainly, a number of Africanist scholars (Schatzberg, Chabal and Daloz) believe that 
there is a distinctive African political culture that is paternalistic and conservative.  
 
Socio-Economic factors 
 Next, we want to ask: what is the impact of socio-economic factors on the 
likelihood of opposition cohesion?  First, ethnic fragmentation and other forms of cultural 
pluralism obviously will make cohesion more difficult, ceteris paribus.  Situations of 
ethnic diversity and polarization probably increase the costs of coalition building and 
provide a built-in advantage to incumbents who can more easily build cross-ethnic 
coalitions with the assistance of state resources (Moestrup, 1999; Crook, 1997).  There is 
some evidence, for instance that ethnic fragmentation results in larger government 
cabinets; such deal-making is costly and often beyond the means of opposition parties.  
True, parties can forge deals involving the cabinet positions each member of the coalition 
will receive in the case of victory, but unless victory seems assured, such deals are harder 
to sustain, and it is easier for the incumbent to match opposition promises.  Again, until 
defections and a loss of credibility have tipped the victory towards the opposition, ethnic 
fragmentation will favor the government.      
 
Second, there is probably a positive correlation between economic development 
and the likelihood of opposition cohesion.  There is probably a positive correlation 
between economic development and urbanization, on the one hand and a more 
institutionalized party system.  In richer countries, municipal and provincial government 
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provides offices for opposition parties, even when they do not control national 
government.  In poor countries, subnational administrations are far more likely to be 
dependent on the center for revenue and thus politically more dependent on the center, 
even if there is nominal democracy.  Having a regional or municipal seat provides offices 
for party officials and patronage possibilities for the party rank and file, which is 
enormously helpful to opposition parties without evident means of finance.  
 
If this is true, then it also follows that parties are stronger in richer countries, even 
if the country has no long experience of democracy (in fact of course richer countries 
tend to have stronger party systems because they have longer experiences of multi-party 
electoral politics).  Strong parties and institutionalized party systems probably facilitate 
coalition building.  In sum, there is a positive correlation between opposition cohesion 
and economic development. 
 
 
International Factors 
Finally, at least two international factors appear to have an effect on the likelihood 
of opposition cohesion.  First, the presence of external pressures for democracy increases 
the costs faced by the incumbent of trying to steal the election and thus provide support 
for the opposition.  Nonetheless, the case of Zimbabwe suggests that autocratic leaders 
can withstand considerable external pressure, so the importance of this factor should not 
be exaggerated.  
 
A second international factor is financing for parties from expatriate communities.  
Little or no data exists on these financial flows, but anecdotal evidence suggests that 
expatriate communities can provide financial support to opposition parties, constituting a 
significant resource, and strengthening the ability of these parties to compete effectively.   
 
In both instances, it is assumed once again that a stronger opposition is more 
likely to win and that as a result it is more likely to be able to coalesce successfully. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The discussion above has been illustrative and suggestive rather then definitive.  
It is clearly important to develop better measures of the concepts discussed here, and 
better data that would allow more formal tests of the hypothesis I have formulated.   
Nonetheless, several patterns appear highly suggestive.  First, I have been able to show 
that opposition cohesion is positively correlated with opposition electoral victory, and, in 
turn with the level of democracy in a country.  Second, the analysis has argued that 
cohesion is often the consequence of victory, rather than its cause.  Clearly, a finer grade 
analysis of specific country cases is necessary to demonstrate this argument more 
conclusively.  Finally, my analysis has shown that a number of factors can influence the 
likelihood of opposition cohesion.  Most strikingly, the nature of the electoral system has 
a decisive effect.  A striking proportion of the cases of successful electoral turnover take 
place in political systems with two-round majority systems, which appear to favor the 
opposition’s ability to forge coalitions.   
  15
References 
 
Anderson, David. “Le Déclin et la chute de la Kanu ”, in Politique Africaine, No. 90 (June 2003) 
 
Baker, Bruce. “Can Democracy in Africa be Sustained ?”, in Commonwealth & Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 9-34 (November 2000). 
 
Banégas, Richard, “Retour sur une Démocratisation Modèle”, in Jean Pascal Daloz and Patrick 
Quantin (eds.) Transitions Démocratiques Africaines. (Paris: Karthala, 1997), pp.23-94. 
 
Bienen, Henry and Nicolas van de Walle. Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern 
World. (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). 
 
Buijtenhuijs, Robert.  Transition et Elections Au Tchad, 1993-1997.  (Paris: Karthala, 1998). 
 
Buijtenhuijs, Robert. 1994. “Les Partis Politiques Africains ont-ils des Projets de Société? 
L’Exemple du Tchad”, in Politique Africaine, no 56 (December). 
 
Burnell, Peter. “The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia : Continuities Past, Present and 
Future”, in  African Affairs, 100, (2001)pp. 239-263. 
 
Burnell, Peter. “Zambia’s 2001 elections : the tyranny of small decisions, ‘non-decisions’ and 
‘not-decisions’”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 1103-1120 (2002). 
 
Camara, Mohamed Saliou, “From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-
Conackry”. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2000, 28, 2, winter, 311-326 
 
Carey, Sabine C. “A Comparative Analysis of Political Parties in Kenya, Zambia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo”, in Democratization, Vol. 9, No.3, pp. 53-71, (Autumn 
2002). 
 
Chabal, Patrick and Jean Pierre Daloz, Africa Works. (London: James Currey, 1999). 
 
Compagnon, Daniel, “Carton Jaune pour Mugabe”, ”, in Politique Africaine. No. 77 (March 
2000), pp. 107-116. 
 
Contamin, Bernard and Bruno Losch, “Côte d’Ivoire: La Voie Etroite”, in Politique Africaine. 
No. 77 (March 2000), pp. 117-128. 
 
Crook, Richard, “Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics: The Failure of the 1990 and 
1995 Elections in Cote d’Ivoire”, in African Affairs, 96, (1997)  pp. 215-242.  
 
Samuel Decalo, “Benin: First of the New Democracies”, in John Clark and David Gardinier, 
Political Reform n Francophone Africa. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997),  pp.43-61. 
 
Diamond, Larry. 2002. Thinking about Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy 13(2): 21-36. 
 
Eboko, Fred. “Les Elites Politiques au Cameroun: Le Renouvellement sans Renouveau?”, in 
Jean-Pascal Daloz (ed.) Le (Non-)Renouvellement Des Elites en Afrique Subsaharienne. 
(Bordeaux: Centre D’Etude d’Afrique Noire, 1999). 
  16
 
Fish, Steven. 2004. How do weak legislatures subvert electoral competition? Draft manuscript.  
 
Furley, Oliver. “Democratisation in Uganda”, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, 
No. 3, pp. 79-102 (November 2000). 
 
Gardinier, David E. “Gabon: Limited Reform and Regime Survival”, in John Clark and David 
Gardinier, Political Reform n Francophone Africa. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 
pp.145-61. 
 
Ihonvbere, Julius. 1998.  “How not to Consolidate Democracy: the Experience of of the 
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in Zambia”, in J.M. Mbaku and J.O. 
Ihonvbere, (eds.) Multiparty Democracy and Political Change. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
 
Heilbrunn, John. “Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo,” Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 31/2 (1993), pp. 277-299. 
 
Laitin, David. Identity in Formation:  The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.) 
 
Lindberg, Staffan. “It’s our Time to ‘Chop’: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism 
rather than Counter-Act it?”, Democratization, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 121-140, (Summer 
2003). 
 
Lorenzo A., Enrico Sborgi. “The 1999 Presidential and Legislative Election in Niger”, Notes on 
Recent Elections/Electoral Studies, Vol. 20, pp. 463-501 (2001) 
 
Mainwaring, Scott, and Scully, Timothy R. (1995) Building Democratic Institutions: Party 
Systems in Latin America.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Moestrup, Sophia. “The Role of Actors and Institutions: The Difficulties of Democratic Survival 
in Mali and Niger”, in Democratization, Vol. 6, No.2, pp171-186, (Summer 1999) 
 
Molomo, Mpho G. “Understanding Government and Opposition Parties in Botswana”, in 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol.38, No.1, pp.65-92, (March 2000). 
 
Oquaye, Mike. “The Process of Democratization in Contemporary Ghana”, in Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 53-78, (November 2000). 
 
Posner, Daniel.  “…Zambia”, in Journal of Democracy 
 
Posner, Daniel. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
 
Quantin, Patrick, “Congo: Transition Democratique et Conjoncture Critique”, in Jean Pascal 
Daloz and Patrick Quantin (eds.) Transitions Démocratiques Africaines. (Paris: Karthala, 
1997), pp. 139-192. 
 
Rakner, Lise. Economic and Political Liberalization in Zambia, 1991-2001. (Uppsala, Sweden: 
Nordic Africa Institute, 2004). 
 
  17
Schatzberg, Michael. Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food. 
         (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2001). 
 
Schedler, Andreas, “Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of 
Democracy 13/2 (April 2002): 36-50.  
 
Schedler, Andreas, “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections,” International Political 
Science Review 23/1 (January 2002): 103-22. 
 
Takougang, Joseph. “The 2002 Legislative Election in Cameroon: a Retrospective on 
Cameroon’s Stalled Democracy Movement”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, 
No. 3 (2003), pp. 421-435. 
 
Thiriot, Céline.  «  Sur Un Renouvellement Relatif des Elites au Mali », in Jean-Pascal Daloz 
(ed.) Le (Non-)Renouvellement Des Elites en Afrique Subsaharienne. (Bordeaux: Centre 
D’Etude d’Afrique Noire, 1999). Pp. 135-54. 
 
Throup, David W., and Charles Hornsby. Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: the Kenyatta & Moi 
States & the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election. (Oxford: J. Currey, 1998). 
 
Van de Walle, Nicolas. “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems”, in 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, no. 2, (June 2003), pp. 297-321. 
 
Vengroff, Richard. “Governance and the Transition to Democracy: Political Parties and the Party 
System in Mali”, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1993), pp. 
541-562. 
 
Villalon, Leonardo. 1994.  “Democratizing a (Quasi) Democracy: The Senegalese Elections of 
1993”, African Affairs, 93, pp. 163-93. 
 
Wolf, Thomas P. “'Kula Kwa Kanu, Kura Kwa NARC' (Take/Eat from Kanu, Vote for NARC): 
Money in the Mombasa 2002 General Election”, Research Report Prepared for 
Transparency International (Kenya), (February, 2003) 
 
Rakner, Lise and Lars Svåsand, “From Dominant to Competitive Party System: The Zambian 
Experience 1991-2001” in Party Politics, Vol. 6, No.5, pp. 729-748. 
 
